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Abstract
The paper explains why some firms transfer their technology to competitors without direct
compensation. We consider a Hotelling market where duopolists sell products with dier-
ent qualities. This market consists of heterogeneous consumers, comprising two groups in
terms of their valuations of product quality. We show that when consumers’ preferences
for product quality are suciently heterogeneous, a high-quality firm benefits from quality-
enhancing technology transfer without payment. Furthermore, we extend the model to a
circular city with four firms and show that a firm can benefit from a technology transfer to
direct competitors rather than to an indirect competitor.
Keywords: Technology transfer, Competitor collaboration, Consumer heterogeneity
JEL Classification Numbers: L24, L41, M21
We are especially grateful to Noriaki Matsushima for his valuable advice. We would also like to thank
Keisuke Hattori, Akio Kawasaki, Tomomichi Mizuno, Yusuke Zennyo, the conference participants at the
Japanese Economic Association (Niigata University), and the seminar participants at Kyoto University and
Osaka University for their very useful comments. The second and corresponding author acknowledges the
financial support from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (Pan, 15J05223). All remaining errors
are our own.
yAddress: Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University, 1-7 Machikaneyama, Toyonaka, Osaka 560-
0043, Japan. E-mail: pge031ys@student.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp
zCorresponding author. Address: Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University, 1-7 Machikaneyama,
Toyonaka, Osaka 560-0043, Japan. E-mail: pge042pc@student.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp
1
1 Introduction
We often observe that firms form an alliance with their competitors. It has been widely recog-
nized in the management literature that one of the most fundamental motivations of strategic
alliances is the transfer of technology or knowledge between partner firms.1 Although one
may think of licensing as a way to conduct a technology transfer, the management literature
shows that it is not always applicable because tacit technology is unverifiable and dicult
to be licensed.2 Even for some explicit technologies, licensing is not applied, because the
mechanism is very complex and costly.3 To provide alliance partners access to these im-
plicit or sophisticated technologies, an advanced firm may even conduct a transfer without
receiving direct compensation.4 This might be surprising from a common sense perspective
since non-compensated sharing of one’s patentable technology means a loss in advantage
that should be avoided even at a cost. However, some empirical works suggest that free
technology transfer exists and is not a rare phenomenon in various industries.5
Our research questions are as follows: why some firms may transfer their technology to
competitors without any payments, and how consumers’ characteristics aect the incentive
for technology transfers. To this end, we first consider a Hotelling duopoly market wherein
firms have dierent technologies in terms of both quality and eciency. Each firm monop-
olizes a group of consumers with strong brand loyalty while competing for other consumers
between them. Thus, this market consists of a “duopoly submarket” and two “monopoly
submarkets.”6
1Gomes-Casseres et al. (2006), for example, find that knowledge flows between alliance partners are greater
than these between pairs of non-allied firms. See also Hamel (1991) and Mowery et al. (1996).
2For further details of contractual diculties in transferring tacit knowledge, see Mowery (1983, p. 354)
and Ghosh and Morita (2012).
3Harho et al. (2003) summarize many empirical works and cases wherein licensing is not chosen for
transferring explicit technology in some industries.
4Other ways for carrying out these types of technology transfer are by organizational combinations such
as joint production or partial equity ownership. A joint venture is a good example (Kogut, 1988). Creane
and Konishi (2009) show numerous cases of joint production with technology transfer in the metallurgical,
automobile, and packaging industries.
5Morita et al. (2010) investigate collaborations among firms and observe 88 cases wherein a firm transfers
its technology without direct compensation. Notably, 59% of the technology transfers occur between firms
without partial equity ownership, which shows that free technology transfer plays an important role.
6Take the videogame software market as an example, where consumers have already bought gaming hard-
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Two key assumptions concerning heterogeneity in consumers’ preferences are made.
First, we assume that consumers can be segmented into groups, and each one shows a specific
brand preference. Second, we assume that these groups are heterogeneous in consumer’s val-
uation of product quality. Kamakura and Russell (1993) empirically show the rationality of
our assumptions. Regarding the first assumption, data analysis on the powder laundry de-
tergent category in the US shows that some consumers have a pronounced preference for
one brand and therefore develop strong brand loyalty, while others buy from several brands.
These consumers are then segmented into dierent groups according to their heterogeneous
brand preferences. For our second assumption, Kamakura and Russell (1993) show that
consumer’s valuation of the same features of a brand can be heterogeneous among these
groups.7
We show the following results. First, when consumers’ preferences for the product qual-
ity are suciently heterogeneous, a technology advantaged firm benefits from transferring
its quality-enhancing technology to a technology inferior firm without direct compensation.
Second, a firm with low-cost technology cannot benefit from a cost-reducing technology
transfer. Furthermore, we extend the model to a circular city with four firms and four con-
sumer groups and show that a firm can benefit from a quality-enhancing technology transfer
to direct competitors rather than to an indirect competitor.
The logic behind our first result is as follows. When the consumers in monopoly sub-
market of the firm with inferior technology (the technology recipient) valuate the quality
enhancement more than those in the duopoly submarket, the demand for this firm increases
more in the monopoly submarket than that in the duopoly submarket. This is clearly harmful
to the firm with superior technology since its market share declines in the duopoly submarket.
However, the technology recipient charges a higher price due to increased demand, which
benefits the technology advantaged firm by decreasing its rival’s demand in the duopoly sub-
ware. PlayStation or Xbox, for instance, belong to the monopoly submarket, and new consumers belong to the
duopoly submarket.
7Needless to say, economists have also theoretically focused on the heterogeneity of consumer preference.
To see more theoretical studies with respect to how consumers heterogeneity aects firms’ behaviors, refer to
Shaked and Sutton (1982) and Ishibashi and Matsushima (2009).
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market. In the duopoly submarket, the latter (strategic) eect from a price increase can dom-
inate the former (direct) eect from quality enhancement; hence, the technology recipient
loses share in the duopoly submarket under some conditions. Thus, the technology advan-
taged firm benefits from a technology transfer by obtaining more demand in the duopoly
submarket.
Our second result shows that the eect on a firms’ profit is opposite whether quality-
enhancing or cost-reducing technology is transferred. The intuition is straightforward. In
our first result, a technology transfer makes a rival to charge a higher price. If the technol-
ogy advantaged firm instead transfers its technology which makes its rival more ecient,
the technology recipient has an incentive to lower its price, which causes the technology
advantaged firm to lose market share in the duopoly submarket.
In contrast to the original model, the extended model allows us to analyze the following
question: whom should a technology advantaged firm transfer its quality-enhancing tech-
nology to? The intuition behind our third result parallels the first. In this model, every two
firms compete for a duopoly submarket, wherein each consumer group has a dierent pref-
erence about product quality. When the firm with superior technology transfers its quality-
enhancing technology to the direct competitor, the direct competitor expands its share, which
is negative for the technology advantaged firm. However, following our first result, the tech-
nology advantaged firm may obtain a higher demand from the higher price charged by the
technology recipient, which can surpass the former negative eect. In contrast, the tech-
nology transfer to an indirect competitor increases the technology recipient’s demand and
price, forcing direct competitors to adapt by undercutting prices. This always diminishes the
technology advantaged firm’s profit.
Our study also has managerial implications for imitation deterrence and industry adver-
tising strategies. First, the extent of tolerance toward rival’s imitation activity varies among
product properties. Our findings give a possible marketing strategy: a rival’s imitation of
product quality may be permitted or even encouraged. Second, from conventional wisdom,
a firm should expect its advertisement to enhance consumers’ willingness to pay only for its
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own product, rather than a rival’s in the same industry. Our results imply that this viewpoint
can have an opposite result: it can be profitable for a firm’s advertisement to help propagate
a rival’ products.
Several papers theoretically discuss the technology transfer among competitors.8 Creane
and Konishi (2009) discuss an asymmetric oligopoly with free entry and exit. An ecient
incumbent firm transfers its cost-reducing technology to another less ecient one. In do-
ing so, profits of alliance partners are enhanced by forcing exit. Matsushima and Ogawa
(2012) discuss a location problem for multiproduct firms. Firms choose whether to disclose
cost-reducing technology. Only when the entrants are in the dierent location with the in-
cumbent firm can they use their know-how. The incumbent firm benefits from the transfer
by driving entrants to a dierent location. Our study diers from the above two studies
as we do not consider free entry or exit. Yoshida (2015) develops a multiproduct Cournot
model with a vertical structure and shows that an ecient firm may have an incentive for
a technology transfer without any payment to its competitor. Matsushima and Zhao (2015)
discuss a bilateral duopoly market wherein downstream firms have outside options when
Nash bargaining breaks down, and show that each upstream firm may voluntarily generate
technological spillover to its rival. Rather than considering a quantity competition model,
we employ a price competition model without vertical relationship.9
This paper also relates to the literature that examines eects of consumer heterogeneity
on market outcomes. We first became inspired by Desai (2001), whose market structure is
similar to ours: consumers are divided into two groups based on their valuations of each
firm’s products, either high or low. That is, consumers are heterogeneous in terms of quality
valuations as well as taste preferences.10 We employ a modified version wherein each firm
8The literature related to technology transfer without payment is sparse because most studies focus on how
to provide license to competitors or how to reduce counterfeiting under weak intellectual property rights (e.g.,
Qian, 2014).
9Ghosh and Morita (2012) consider the technology transfer between firms with a partial equity ownership.
In their model, partial equity ownership is a necessary prerequisite for technology transfer. Milliou and Petrakis
(2012) show that a vertically integrated firm can choose to fully disclose its knowledge to its downstream
rival. This technology transfer intensifies downstream competition but expands downstream market size, which
increases the wholesale revenue of the vertically integrated firm.
10In addition, Tyagi (2004), Ellison (2005) and Shi et al. (2013) assume both vertical and horizontal hetero-
geneity. Ellison (2005) considers two consumer types for quality valuations, whereas Tyagi (2004) and Shi et
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monopolizes a high-valuation consumer group (or consumers with strong brand loyalty).
Chen and Riordan (2007) discuss a similar model, which involves consumer heterogeneity.11
Their model has three relevant categories of consumers: (i) consumers whose first and sec-
ond preferred brands are available; (ii) consumers whose first preferred brand is available,
whereas the second preferred one is not; (iii) consumers whose second preferred brand is
available, whereas the first preferred one is not. Consumers in the duopoly (monopoly) sub-
market in our model may correspond to those in category (i) ((ii) or (iii)). Varian (1980)
also considers how the existence of heterogeneous consumer groups aects firms’ pricing
strategies. In this model, heterogeneity comes from each consumer’s dierent information.
We can also interpret that consumers in a monopoly submarket lack information about one
of these two firms. Therefore, we can apply our results to various market structures.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets up our model, Section 3
derives an equilibrium and analyzes the incentive for a technology transfer, Section 4 extends
our model and shows further results, and Section 5 oers some concluding remarks.
2 A Simple Model
Consider a linear city along the interval [0;1), wherein consumers are uniformly distributed
on [0; 1] with mass 1, while on (1;1) with mass M.12 Firm i (i = 0; 1) is located at i and
selling a product of quality qi. Let pi denote the price of products of firm i.
[Figure 1 about here]
There are two groups of consumers, D and M. Consumers D are in a duopoly market
supplied by both (i.e., duopoly submarket). Consumers M are in a monopoly market supplied
al. (2013) consider continuous type.
11Reggiani (2014) extends Chen and Riordan’s (2007) basic spokes structure to a spatial model wherein each
firm decides its position on the spoke assigned by nature and discriminates consumers in price based on their
respective spokes.
12For simplicity, we assume that consumers in one of these two ranges are distributed infinitely. This as-
sumption can be relaxed. Additionally, we assume asymmetric densities of the two submarkets. The derived
propositions about consumer heterogeneity are given, including terms of the relative size of these two submar-
kets. If we instead assume symmetric densities for these two ranges, and asymmetry in consumers’ transporta-
tion cost as in Desai (2001) and Pazgal et al. (2013), the conditions for our propositions can also be modified
in terms of heterogeneity in consumers’ tastes.
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by only firm 1 (i.e., monopoly submarket). For simplicity, we analyze this asymmetric model
wherein only firm 1 has a monopoly submarket. We obtain qualitatively similar results if we
assume that each firm has a monopoly submarket. Furthermore, as shown in Section 4, while
dierent submarkets are essential for our results, the monopoly submarket is not necessarily
needed.
Consumers buy up to one unit from one of the firms. Each group of consumers has dier-
ent preferences over product quality,13 which are represented by the dierentiable functions
vD(q) and vM(q).14 It is natural that consumers’ willingness to pay should increase with
product quality. However, v(q) here need not be strictly increasing in q.15 The utility of the
consumer located at x 2 [0; 1] is given by,
UD(x) =
8>>><>>>:
k + vD(q0)   p0   tx if she buys from firm 0,
k + vD(q1)   p1   t(1   x) if she buys from firm 1,
0 if she does not buy,
(1)
where k is a suciently large positive constant, but not too large to ensure interior solutions
for mathematical simplicity. The parameter t, the exogenous parameter of transport cost
incurred by the consumer, measures the substitutability between any given pair of products.
This formulation can be justified as follows: the product comprises several characteristics
and consumers are heterogeneous in evaluating one of these characteristics. It is along that
characteristic each firm dierentiates its product. As for the other characteristics, consumers
are homogeneous and k is their common valuation (Belleflamme and Peitz, 2010, p. 224).
The utility of the consumer located at y 2 (1;1) is given by
UM(y) =
(
k + vM(q1)   p1   t(y   1) if she buys from firm 1,
0 if she does not buy. (2)
Let xˆ01(p0; p1) be the consumer who is indierent between buying from firm 0 and firm 1
and yˆ1(p0; p1) be the consumer who is indierent between buying from firm 1 and buying
13In Tirole (1988, pp. 143-144), the consumer taste parameter can be denoted by the inverse of the “marginal
utility of income.” Thus, consumers with dierent incomes have varying willingness to pay.
14We employ the model with consumer heterogeneity in terms of quality valuation. We would obtain essen-
tially similar results with heterogeneous consumer groups in terms of price elasticity, as in Ellison (2005).
15For example, young people expect smart phones with many functions. However, this is not the case for
older individuals.
7
nothing. The values of xˆ01 and yˆ1 are given as follows:
xˆ01 =
1
2
+
vD(q0)   vD(q1) + p1   p0
2t
; (3)
and
yˆ1 = 1 +
k + vM(q1)   p1
t
: (4)
Thus, the demand facing firm 0, D0, and that facing firm 1, D1, are given by
D0 =
1
2
+
vD(q0)   vD(q1) + p1   p0
2t
; (5)
and
D1 =
 
1
2
+
vD(q1)   vD(q0) + p0   p1
2t
!
+ M
 
k + vM(q1)   p1
t
!
: (6)
Assume that the constant marginal cost of firm i is ci and that c0 is normalized to 0. Thus,
firm 0 has both high-quality and low-cost technology, which implies that the technologies are
correlated. However, this assumption is not crucial for our results.16 The profits of firm i are
i = (pi   ci)Di: (7)
Hereafter, we restrict our attention to interior solutions. In our model, firm 1 gets profit
from both the duopoly and monopoly submarkets. It is possible that firm 1 still benefits from
abandoning the duopoly submarket, specializing in supplying only the monopoly submarket.
For example, when k is very large, firm 1 can benefit by setting such a price that consumers
in the duopoly submarket do not buy from firm 1 at all. To eliminate this case, we implicitly
assume that k is not too large. As we discuss in the next section, the conditions for our results
hold when an interior solution exists.
In this setting, firms engage in one-shot price competition. Note that decision making
related to a technology transfer is not included in the game. We analyze whether firms have
an incentive for a technology transfer by comparative statics.
16We do not have to explicitly assume which firm is a high-quality firm. Since a natural presumption is that
a high-quality firm can transfer its technology to a low-quality one, it is natural to assume that q0 > q1. If the
low-quality firm can transfer its technology to a high-quality one, we do not need this assumption.
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3 Analysis
In this section, we go through firms’ optimization problems. Since the model is standard, we
briefly sketch the outline of the analysis. Each firm chooses its price pi so as to maximize its
own profit. After few line computations, we have the reaction functions,
R0(p1) = vD(q0)   vD(q1) + t + p12 ; (8)
R1(p0) = 2M[k + vM(q1) + c1] + vD(q1)   vD(q0) + t + c1 + p02(1 + M) : (9)
Note that a direct eect of an increase in q1 shifts firm 0’s reaction function downwards
and shifts firm 1’s reaction function upwards. The valuations for product quality vM and vD
strongly relate to the eect on the firm 1’s reaction function.
Assuming that an interior solution exists, the equilibrium prices are
p0 =
(1 + 4M)[vD(q0)   vD(q1)] + 2M[k + vM(q1)] + (3 + 4M)t + (1 + 2M)c1
3 + 8M ; (10)
p1 =
vD(q1)   vD(q0) + 4M[k + vM(q1)] + 3t + 2(1 + 2M)c1
3 + 8M : (11)
Equations (10) and (11) show that an increase in vM(q1) motivates firm 1 to raise its price to
further exploit consumers in the monopoly submarket. firm 0 can benefit from this eect due
to strategic complementarity.
The resulting firms’ profits are
0 =
n
(1 + 4M)[vD(q0)   vD(q1)] + 2M[k + vM(q1)] + (3 + 4M)t + (1 + 2M)c1
o2
2t(3 + 8M)2 ; (12)
1 =
(1 + 2M)
n
4M[k + vM(q1)]   vD(q0) + vD(q1) + 3t   (1 + 4M)c1
o2
2t(3 + 8M)2 : (13)
We now turn to the central issue, namely the incentive for the technology transfer, which
enhances the quality of a rival firm without direct compensation. Consider that firm 0 can
transfer its quality-enhancing technology on product quality to firm 1, and that the transfer
maintains the eciency level of firm 1. The following result is obtained.
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Proposition 1 Firm 0 may have an incentive to transfer its quality-enhancing technology
without any payment. Formally,
d0
dq1
> 0 , v
0
D(q1)
v0M(q1)
<
2M
1 + 4M
:
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is that a technology transfer has both direct and in-
direct eects on a firm’s profit, and these eects work in opposite directions. A technology
transfer enhances the quality of a rival firm, which directly reduces the demand for firm 0
(see Equation (5)). Note that a technology transfer has a dierent impact on quality valua-
tion for each type of consumer. Under the proposition’s condition, consumers in a monopoly
submarket evaluate quality enhancement more than those do in the duopoly submarket. On
the other hand, firm 1 increases its price to adjust to the increased demand due to the direct
eect. For firm 1’s demand from the duopoly submarket, the direct eect from quality en-
hancement can be dominated by the indirect eect from the price increase; hence, the overall
eect of the transfer can reduce firm 1’s demand from the duopoly submarket. Thus, both
firm 0 and firm 1 benefit from a technology transfer by obtaining more demand.
Note that the left-hand side of the condition for Proposition 1 depends only on the deriva-
tives of vM and vD. Thus, we can find a certain parameter set, that satisfies both the interior
solution condition and that of Proposition 1. This argument can be applied to the other
propositions in this paper as well. In addition, it is noteworthy that the condition in Proposi-
tion 1 would relax when better technology makes firm 1 enjoy a quality enhancement while
undertaking higher cost, because rising cost further drives up firm 1’s price.
Now we turn to the next question: does a firm have an incentive to transfer its cost-
reducing technology to its competitor?
Proposition 2 Firm 0 has no incentive to transfer its cost-reducing technology without any
payment. Formally, d0=dc1 > 0.
The intuition behind the proposition is as follows. Transfers of quality-enhancing tech-
nology and cost-reducing technology have absolutely opposite eects on firm 1’s pricing
strategy. The former increases firm 1’s price while the latter decreases it. When firm 1 low-
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ers its marginal cost, firm 0 has to undercut its price; therefore, its profit decreases. Hence,
firm 0 does not transfer cost-reducing technology to its rival.
4 Extension of the Model
Consider a model extended to a circular city model with four firms, as in a la Vickrey (1964)
and Salop (1979).17 Firm i 2 f0; 1; 2; 3g is located at i=4 and is selling a product of quality
qi. Assuming that each firm produces at no cost, we only need discuss transfers of quality-
enhancing technology. We also assume that a unit mass of consumers is uniformly distributed
on a circle of circumference 1 and that consumers are categorized into four groups depending
on their locations. We now call consumers between firm i and i + 1, type i i + 1. Their
preferences over a product’s quality are represented by function vi i+1(q). The structure of
the extended model is depicted in Figure 2.
[Figure 2 about here]
The utility of the consumer located at x 2 [i=4; (i + 1)=4) is
Ui i+1(x) =
8>>><>>>:
k + vi i+1(qi)   pi   td(x; i4 ) if she buys from firm i,
k + vi i+1(qi+1)   pi+1   td(x; i+14 ) if she buys from firm i + 1,
0 if she does not buy,
where d(x; i=4) is the distance between consumer x and firm i on the circle. When i + 1 = 4,
we replace 4 with 0.18
Let xˆi j(pi; p j) be the consumer whose utility does not change, regardless of which firm is
chosen. These are
xˆ01(p0; p1) = 18 +
v01(q0)   v01(q1) + p1   p0
2t
; xˆ12(p1; p2) = 38 +
v12(q1)   v12(q2) + p2   p1
2t
;
(14)
17We can easily extend the model to more than four firms. However, analysis of a market with four firms is
important because each firm has both direct and indirect competitors.
18Consumers’ preferences are similar to those in Chen and Riordan (2007), wherein each consumer only
cares about two possible brands, in contrast to Salop (1979). Although we can employ the preferences of Salop
model, we assume the Chen-Riordan type preference for simplicity. See Chen and Riordan (2007, p. 903) for
justification of these preferences.
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xˆ23(p2; p3) = 58 +
v23(q2)   v23(q3) + p3   p2
2t
; xˆ30(p3; p0) = 78 +
v30(q3)   v30(q0) + p0   p3
2t
:
(15)
Each firm simultaneously chooses its price pi to maximize its own profit. Define i i+1 =
vi i+1(qi)   vi i+1(qi+1). Assuming that an interior solution exists, we obtain the equilibrium
prices as follows.
p0 =
t
4
+
5(01   30) + 12   23
24
; p1 =
t
4
+
5(12   01) + 23   30
24
; (16)
p2 =
t
4
+
5(23   12) + 30   01
24
; p3 =
t
4
+
5(30   23) + 01   12
24
: (17)
After a few line computations, we obtain the equilibrium profit of firm i as follows.
i =
(pi )2
t
: (18)
This leads us to the following proposition:
Proposition 3 (i) Firm 0 may have an incentive to transfer its quality-enhancing technology
to a direct competitor. Formally,
d0
dq1
> 0 , v
0
01(q1)
v012(q1)
<
1
5 :
(ii) Firm 0 has no incentive to transfer its quality-enhancing technology to an indirect com-
petitor. Formally, d0=dq2 < 0.
Because of its symmetry, note that this statement can be applied not only to firm 0 but
also to other firms. The proposition makes two claims. The first claim is more illuminating,
stating that a firm may have an incentive to transfer technology to its “direct competitors.”
The intuition behind part (i) is similar to that of Proposition 1. When a technology transfer
increases the valuation of type 12 more than that of type 01, the increase in price can be so
large that firm 1’s demand from type 01 decreases. Since the prices of firms 2 and firm 3
decrease, firm 0’s demand from type 30 decreases. When the condition for the proposition
is satisfied, the technology transfer allows firm 0 to expand its total demand and increase its
price and then get more profit.
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The second claim says that firms have no incentive for a technology transfer to an “indi-
rect competitor.” The technology transfer increases the demand of indirect competitor. The
indirect competitor increase its price, whereas the direct competitors undercut their prices.
This forces firm 0 to decrease its price, leading to a decreased profit.
Note that if the condition for claim (i) is satisfied, firm 2 does not have an incentive to
transfer its technology to firm 1. Moreover, the condition for the technology transfer by firm
2 to firm 3 is independent of firm 1’s quality. Thus, a technology transfer does not trigger
another one.
5 Concluding Remarks
Our paper discusses competitor collaboration and shows some results contrary to the conven-
tional wisdom that managers should protect their technologies from imitation. As discussed
in our basic model, an advantaged firm may help its rival with quality-enhancing technology
when there exist heterogeneous consumer groups who evaluate such quality enhancement
dierently. Although technology makes a rival firm more competitive in product’ quality, it
aects the rival’s pricing strategy as well. The technology advantaged firm can benefit from
such transfer by driving up the rival’s price to obtain a larger market share. From this result,
we further show that cost-reducing technology, which cuts down the technology recipient’s
price, should not be transferred.
We also discuss a circular model with four firms and resolve which rival would receive the
technology. We show that a firm may benefit from transferring quality-enhancing technology
to its direct competitor by driving up the recipient’s price. A firm does not benefit from
transferring its technology to an indirect competitor, because quality enhancement for the
indirect competitor depresses the direct competitors’ prices, and create a disadvantage for
the technology advantaged firm.
Our model can distinguish the dierent eects of quality-enhancing and cost-reducing
types of a technology transfer. Most existing models (e.g., Matsushima and Ogawa (2012)
and Yoshida (2015)) can not distinguish these two types because both quality enhancement
13
and cost reduction shift the technology recipient’s best response curve outwards, which en-
larges its output while intensifying competition. Our price-setting model can distinguish the
eect of dierent types of technology transfer. The quality-enhancing type increases the
technology recipient’s price, whereas the cost-reducing one decreases it. We believe that the
benefit of our model can be applied to other market structures (e.g., Bertrand model).
Welfare analysis is not involved in this paper because it is not always suitable with a
Hotelling type demand. In our basic setting, enhanced quality increases consumers’ willing-
ness to pay, attracting more of them to the monopoly submarket and increasing the surplus
of consumers there. However, from the standpoint of the whole market, asymmetries in con-
sumer type, population, product quality, and production cost make analyzing the tradeo
between losses and gains in our model mathematically dicult to accomplish. Despite this,
using a numerical simulation approach on the simplest case, wherein consumer’s valuation
of product quality takes a linear form, v(q) = q, we are able to make an approximate predic-
tion that quality-enhancing technology transfer enhances both social welfare and consumer
surplus. However, the eects on each consumer group are dierent: the technology transfer
enhances consumer surplus in the monopoly submarket but harms the surplus in the duopoly
submarket.
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Figure 1: The market structure (linear)
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Figure 2: The market structure (circle)
18
